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 Chapter 16 
 Building National Identity in Newborn 
Kosovo: Challenges of Integrating National 
Identity with Ethnic Identity Among Kosovar 
Albanians and Kosovar Serbs 
 Edona  Maloku ,  Belle  Derks ,  Colette  Van  Laar , and  Naomi  Ellemers 
 “NEW life is born 
 NEW hope is born 
 NEW future is born 
 NEW country is born” 
 On February 17th 2008, these slogans, together with the typographical sculpture 
 “NEWBORN” , were revealed at the centre of Prishtina, marking Kosovo’s 
Declaration of Independence. Every year, tribute to  independence is paid by having 
Kosovo citizens paint the letters of the monument to reﬂ ect major events that marked 
the past year. On its ﬁ rst anniversary, NEWBORN was painted on the ﬂ ags of all 
countries that accepted Kosovo’s independence, thanking them for their support. 
However, on marking the 7th birthday in 2015, NEWBORN reﬂ ected a very differ-
ent reality, after the glow of independence had worn off: It represented newborn 
Kosovo in bright multi-colours, with letter E completely painted in black to symbol-
ise the gloom of the recent “Exodus” of about 10,000 Kosovo citizens who ﬂ ed to 
European countries in just 1 month at the beginning of 2015 (Bytyçi & Than,  2015 ). 
The black E was also said to be reﬂ ective of the country’s gloomy “Economy”, one 
of the main reasons people seek a better life abroad. 
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 Most of the  people seeking asylum from Kosovo into European countries are 
young, as is Kosovo’s population. Demographically, it represents the country with 
one of the youngest populations in Europe, with over 60 % under the age of 35 
(Kosovo Agency of Statistics [KAS],  2012 ). However, despite the potential and 
big dreams following independence, Kosovo remains one of the poorest countries 
in Europe (World Bank,  2010 ). Although the country has a lot of potential, one of 
its major problems is that it struggles with its  history and the ethnic segregation 
among its population. The two largest  ethnic groups , an overwhelming majority of 
ethnic Albanians and a much smaller minority of ethnic Serbs, have a conﬂ icting 
past and now have to come to terms with one another in the new country. In the 
current chapter we present our ﬁ rst steps in a new research project that aims to 
uncover the difﬁ culties of creating a new national identity based on these two 
highly segregated ethnic groups. In so doing, we ﬁ rst provide a short historical 
background of the territory and these ethnic groups to understand the particulari-
ties of the context. Then, we present a recent study into the identities of Kosovar 
Albanians and Kosovar Serbs with the goal of determining strategies to improve 
relations between them. 
 Historical Background 
 Located between Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia, the tiny former 
Yugoslav territory that is now Kosovo ethnically comprises a majority of Albanians 
(93 %), with the remaining 7 % from other  ethnic groups : Serbs, Bosniaks, Turks, 
Gorani, and Ashkali, Egyptian and Roma or RAE (KAS,  2012 ). The Serb ethnic 
group at 5 % is considered to be the largest non-dominant ethnic minority group in 
the country (Kosovo Government,  2015 ). As such, it has reserved rights, including 
a reserved 10 out of 120 seats in Kosovo’s Parliament. 
 In order to understand Kosovo’s ethnic groups today, one needs to consider the 
differences that construe Albanian and Serb identities in terms of religion and 
 language (for more background information see Judah,  2008 ; Malcolm,  1998 ; 
O’Neill,  2002 ). For Serbs, identity is primarily moulded around their Orthodox 
Christian religion, and the Orthodox Church is strongly entwined with what is now 
a Serb identity in the Balkans (Judah,  2008 ). For  Serbs , language, however, is not 
identity-deﬁ ning as Serbs use the same language as Bosnians and Croats, although 
with regional variations (Judah,  2008 ). For  Albanians , culture and language are 
identity- deﬁ ning as they are distinctive and unify Albanians throughout the Balkans. 
Religion, however, is not deﬁ ning of Albanian identity because, although the major-
ity of Albanians is Muslim, there are also Catholic and Orthodox Albanians. In 
Kosovo, Albanians speak Albanian, and Serbs speak Serbian. Because of this differ-
ence, both Albanian and Serbian languages have been ofﬁ cially recognised as for-
mal languages in the new Kosovo (Assembly of Kosovo,  2001 ). 
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 Kosovo’s Signifi cance in Albanian and Serbian Construal 
of  History 
 Historically, Albanians and Serbs  both groups feel entitled to Kosovo. Although 
mainly populated by Albanians, Kosovo has been a nationalist aspiration for both 
ethnicities. To Albanians, Kosovo represents the place where the Albanian national 
movement was launched in 1878 (in Prizren, East of Kosovo). Decades later, 
Kosovo’s territory was given to Serbia in 1912 and not included in today’s borders 
of Albania (Judah,  2008 ). On the other hand, for Serbs, Kosovo is viewed as the 
holy place where most of their historic churches are located. In essence, for Serbs 
Kosovo is what Jerusalem is to Jews (Judah,  2008 ). The discrepancies in what 
Kosovo means to each of the ethnic groups have always been problematic and con-
tinue to fuel the differences even today. While Albanians see Kosovo’s indepen-
dence as historical justice ﬁ nally being brought to the people, Serbs view it as unjust 
separation from Serbia, fragmenting the heart of Serbian identity. 
 There was a time when Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo coexisted peacefully. When 
the Yugoslav Federation was created and led by President Tito, his economic and dip-
lomatic policies maintained peace within the Federation. However, following Tito’s 
death, his Serb successor Slobodan Milosevic (1989–2004) gave rise to Serb national-
ism, annulling Kosovo’s autonomous status within the Federation. As the Yugoslav 
constituent Republics revolted against his nationalist politics and left the Federation, 
Kosovo became the site of uprisings, reprisals, and general shedding of blood (Malcolm, 
 1998 ). This eventually erupted in an armed conﬂ ict in 1998 that left more than 10,000 
people dead and that only ended  through international military intervention. 
 Kosovo Today 
 Today, Kosovar Albanians continue to live with the memory of the recent conﬂ ict, 
with over 1600 people still missing and mass gravesites being opened throughout 
Kosovo and Serbia (International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC],  2014 ). The 
Kosovar Serbs have settled in segregated “ pocket regions” throughout the country 
and maintain allegiance to Serbia. Although there is Serb political representation, 
contact across ethnic lines is minimal. Both ethnicities have settled into parallel 
lives with very little to do with one another (Judah,  2008 ). 
 The secession from former Yugoslavia and the declaration of independence in 
2008 led to the creation of the newest national identity in  Europe , the Kosovar 
Identity, as an overarching identity that gathers various  ethnicities and religions . In 
an attempt to provide a national identity that is free from ethnic-references (espe-
cially for Albanians and Serbs), symbols of the new republic have all been neutrally 
designed. This includes a text-free anthem that has only instrumental music, to 
exclude possible ethnic biases in wording. The ﬂ ag is pale blue, resembling the 
European Union ﬂ ag, with Kosovo’s map at the centre to symbolise the territorial 
compactness of the  country’s fragile borders (see Fig.  16.1 ). The top of the ﬂ ag is 
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arched with six white stars, each representing a formally recognised ethnic group in 
the country. As such, these important symbolic means of representation for the 
Kosovar identity provide a vague identiﬁ cation for all ethnic groups.
 Despite the small but signiﬁ cant political progress, Kosovo remains a segregated 
society characterised by conﬂ ict. The potential of the country continues to be hin-
dered by discrimination among ethnicities and poor quality of life (United Nations 
Development Program [UNDP],  2010 ). As a result, the lives of Kosovo’s people are 
far from normalised. Apart from daily hassles and struggles, people in Kosovo are 
now faced with yet another challenge: the creation of an overarching Kosovar 
 national identity , as they need to adapt to their new national identity, re-evaluate old 
ethnic identities, and negotiate possible conﬂ icts between old and new identities. 
Our work tries to shed light on this process in this context. The goal of our research 
is to examine how Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs shape their identity, and 
to ﬁ nd ways that bring them closer under a common national identity. 
 Building a Kosovar Identity for All Ethnic Groups 
 The new Kosovar  national identity provides an opportunity for the improvement of 
relations between Albanians and Serbs. Past research on social categorisation and 
common in-group identity has already shown that if members of different groups 
can conceive of themselves as belonging to a common superordinate category 
(Kosovar  national identity in this case), this improves attitudes toward out-groups 
(e.g. ethnic out-groups) because former out-group members are perceived as in-group 
members in the  superordinate category (Brewer,  1979 ; Gaertner & Dovidio,  2000 ; 
McKeown,  2014 ). In this case, if Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo recategorise them-
selves more in terms of their national identity, then, despite ethnic differences 
groups may start to see themselves as part of a common national group and thus 
extend positive in-group attitudes to the ethnic out-group. 
 However, there are several reasons why a Kosovar national identity may not have 
this beneﬁ cial effect. Firstly, as posited by the  in-group projection model 
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(Mummendey & Wenzel,  1999 ), the Albanian majority group is likely to perceive 
their ethnic group as being more representative of the superordinate identity. This 
means that they will project features of their own ethnic group onto the superordi-
nate Kosovar identity, leaving little room for features of other ethnic groups. 
Although Kosovar Albanians may identify strongly with the superordinate Kosovar 
identity, this does not mean that this improves their perceptions of Serbs, as they 
may not see Kosovar Serbs as ﬁ tting the Kosovar identity. 
 Kosovar Serbs, meanwhile, may beneﬁ t from superordinate identiﬁ cation with 
the new Kosovar identity, but are less likely to do so as they may feel that their 
 ethnic identity is insufﬁ ciently acknowledged in this new identity. Research from 
the social identity perspective has already shown that people strive to make their 
group positively distinct from out-groups (Tajfel & Turner,  1979 ) and when this is 
not the case, a sense of social identity  threat (i.e. “distinctiveness threat”) arises 
(Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje,  1999 ; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 
 2002 ; Jetten, Spear, & Manstead,  2001 ). This threat is particularly pronounced 
among members of disadvantaged or low status groups like minorities, and espe-
cially among group members who strongly identify with the group (e.g. Branscombe 
et al.,  1999 ). In Kosovo’s case, such threats are likely to create reluctance in Kosovar 
Serbs to identify with the Kosovar nationality, especially among those who identify 
highly with their  ethnic identity . Indeed, previous research has revealed that while 
there is a positive relation between national and ethnic identiﬁ cation for majority 
groups, for minorities this relation is absent or even negative (Sidanius, Feshbach, 
Levin, & Pratto,  1997 ; Sinclair, Sidanius, & Levin,  1998 ). Given that distinctive-
ness threat has been associated with increased intergroup bias (Branscombe et al., 
 1999 ; Jetten et al.,  2001 ; Tajfel & Turner,  1979 ; see Riek, Mania, & Gaertner,  2006 
for a review on intergroup threat), it seems unlikely that emphasising the new super-
ordinate Kosovar identity will  magically improve intergroup relations. 
 Because of the differences that these two  ethnic groups were predicted to have in 
relation to national identity, the ﬁ rst goal of our research project was to examine the 
degree to which Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs identify with their ethnic 
and national identity. Knowing this allows us to understand how these groups deﬁ ne 
what it means to be Kosovar. Moreover, this allowed us to test whether the degree 
to which Albanians and Serbs identiﬁ ed with the common national identity predicts 
more positive intergroup attitudes. 
 Integrating Nationality and Ethnicity Through  Social Identity 
Complexity 
 Apart from testing whether intergroup relations in Kosovo beneﬁ t from superordi-
nate categorisation, we propose that it is also important to take into account the 
 complexity of the Kosovar Albanian and Kosovar Serb identities. According to 
social identity complexity theory (Roccas & Brewer,  2002 ), simply  belonging to 
different social categories that are cross-cutting (as is the case for Albanians and 
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Serbs with Kosovar nationality) may not be sufﬁ cient for positive intergroup atti-
tudes. Instead, intergroup relations may improve to the degree that people  subjec-
tively combine their multiple identities in complex in-group representations (Brewer, 
 2010 ). When people belong to different groups (e.g. ethnicity, religion, nationality), 
there often is overlap between these identities, i.e. members of one’s ethnic group 
are also part of one’s religious or national group. However, there are also parts of 
the groups that do not overlap, for example, when not all people from a national 
group are of the same ethnicity. People differ in the degree to which they manage 
the presence and absence of overlap in their identity, and this is what we refer to as 
“social identity complexity”. Identities are low in complexity when they reﬂ ect only 
the overlap between the multiple groups to which people belong (Brewer & Pierce, 
 2005 ; Roccas & Brewer,  2002 ). In our case, when Kosovar Albanians with low 
identity complexity think about Kosovars they think, for example, about Kosovar 
Albanians from their own region who share a similar religion (high overlap). We 
speak of higher identity complexity when people deﬁ ne their in-group not only with 
the people who share the different group memberships (e.g. Kosovar Albanian 
Muslims from the same region) but  also with people who share one identity but not 
others (e.g. Kosovar Serbs from a different region). Based on shared nationality, 
Kosovar Albanians with higher identity complexity would include Serbs into their 
in-group, even though there is little overlap with them on other (e.g. ethnic and 
religious) identities. As a result, although all Kosovar Serbs and Albanians are part 
of Kosovo, only those with relatively complex identities are likely to perceive their 
ethnic out-group in a positive way. 
 Indeed, higher social  identity complexity has been shown to positively predict a 
number of positive intergroup outcomes, including more favourable attitudes 
towards out-groups, more support for diversity policies and less distinctiveness 
threat (Brewer & Pierce,  2005 ; Miller, Brewer, & Arbuckle,  2009 ; Roccas & 
Brewer,  2002 ; Schmid, Hewstone, Tausch, Cairns, & Hughes,  2009 ). In this study 
we also examine whether, over and above the effects of superordinate categorisa-
tion, increased identity complexity is related to more positive intergroup relations. 
This will allow us to then predict ways in which relations between Albanians and 
Serbs in Kosovo could be improved so that reconciliation between groups is 
achieved in the peace-building process of the new country. 
 Based on these principles we predict that Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs 
will differ in social identity complexity. We expect Kosovar Albanians to be low in 
identity complexity and to perceive more overlap between ethnicity and nationality 
(most Kosovars are Albanian). Serbs, on the other hand, are more likely to have a more 
complex identity as they need to reﬂ ect the fact that many Kosovars are not Serbs in 
their identity. However, even within the reality of their minority status, Kosovar Serbs 
will vary in how much overlap they perceive between the groups to which they belong 
(e.g. ethnicity, nationality, religion). Indeed, attesting the subjectivity of complexity 
research on minority groups in Australia (Brewer, Gonsalkorale, & Van Dommelen, 
 2013 ) found that minority members showed signiﬁ cantly lower complexity (high 
overlap) than majority members, despite them being objectively less represented in 
the population (Brewer et al.,  2013 ). We aimed to test whether for both ethnic groups 
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 higher identity complexity predicted more positive intergroup attitudes, including 
higher warmth towards the ethnic out-group, more willingness for intergroup contact 
and more positive evaluations of out-group members (Brewer & Pierce,  2005 ; Miller 
et al.,  2009 ; Roccas & Brewer,  2002 ; Schmid et al.,  2009 ). We also wanted to exam-
ine how social identity complexity relates to  distinctiveness threat for these groups 
as previous research showed that higher distinctiveness threat is associated with 
lower social identity complexity (e.g. Roccas & Brewer,  2002 ; Schmid et al.,  2009 ). 
 Kosovar Identity Among Albanian and Serb Nationals: First 
Evidence 
 What follows, is our research ﬁ ndings on the ethnic and national identiﬁ cation and 
identity complexity among Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs. Our main aim 
was to test the two ways of improving  intergroup relations described above—super-
ordinate categorisation and social identity complexity—and examine which of the 
two would prove most effective in improving intergroup relations between Kosovar 
Albanians and Serbs. To our knowledge, no research exists examining social identity 
and its association with peace and conﬂ ict in Kosovo and we are thus pioneers in this 
context. Apart from practical relevance, our work is important because of the unique 
characteristics of the intergroup situation. Not only is there limited research on the 
intergroup dynamics between groups that are as different in size, as segregated and 
as unwilling to have intergroup relations as the two groups under investigation here, 
the situation of Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo is unique because their new national 
identity is a very recent development. Therefore, our research uniquely contributes 
to existing research on identity development, superordinate categorisation and inter-
group relations because the content of the new identity is still under negotiation. 
 In the following section we give a review of our initial results from a survey 
among 229 Albanian participants from the  University of Prishtina “Hasan Prishtina”, 
and 80 Serb participants from the University of Prishtina in North Mitrovica (see 
Maloku, Derks, Van Laar, & Ellemers,  2015 for details). We ﬁ rst present our ﬁ nd-
ings on ethnic and national identiﬁ cation among Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar 
Serbs. Then we provide an initial picture of how complex identities are for these 
groups. Finally, we discuss current intergroup attitudes and examine which strat-
egy, i.e. superordinate categorisation or social identity complexity, seems most 
promising in improving intergroup attitudes. 
 To What Extent Do Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs 
Identify with Their  Ethnicity and Nationality? 
 As predicted, for Albanians the Kosovar identity was almost equivalent to Albanian 
identity: Kosovar Albanians identiﬁ ed to the same degree  with both their ethnicity 
and their nationality. The strong correlation between these two measures suggests a 
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high degree of overlap between ethnic and national identiﬁ cation. Similarly, 
Albanians felt just as warm towards Albanians as towards Kosovars, again suggest-
ing the psychological similarities of these groups to Albanians. For Serbs however, 
nationality and ethnicity appeared to imply very different constructs: Whereas they 
identiﬁ ed with their ethnicity to the same degree as Kosovar Albanians did, they 
identiﬁ ed much less with their Kosovar nationality. Also, Serbs felt warm towards 
other Kosovar Serbs but neutral towards Kosovars in general. For Serbs, there was 
no relationship between ethnic and national identiﬁ cation, consistent with previous 
studies on American ethnic minorities (e.g. Sidanius et al.,  1997 ; Sinclair et al., 
 1998 ). Combined, these results suggest that superordinate categorisation does not 
yet function as a conﬂ ict reducing mechanism as for Albanians the superordinate 
national identity is conﬂ ated with ethnic identity, while it is a non-identity for the 
Serb minority. 
 How Complex Are the Identities of Kosovar Albanians 
and Kosovar Serbs? 
 As in previous work (see, for example, Brewer & Pierce,  2005 ) social identity com-
plexity was assessed by measuring perceived overlap between four categories (apart 
from ethnicity and nationality, participants self-selected their two most important 
groups from a list; for most participants this was their religious and student identity). 
Our ﬁ ndings reveal that, as predicted, Kosovar Albanians indeed have identities that 
are low in complexity (e.g. high perceived overlap between Albanian and Kosovar 
identities). Reﬂ ecting their minority status Serbs are slightly higher in identity com-
plexity (i.e. lower perceived overlap between Serbs and Kosovars). Comparing the 
means with previous work with majority-minority groups (e.g. Brewer et al.,  2013 ; 
Brewer & Pierce,  2005 ) revealed that it is not so much the case that Serbs have  a 
more complex identity. Rather, Albanians have identities that are  extremely low in 
complexity. 1 Finally, replicating previous work, for both ethnic groups lower com-
plexity was related  to higher national identiﬁ cation. Although this ﬁ nding may seem 
counterintuitive it may suggest that lower identity complexity allowed Albanians 
and Serbs to identify with Kosovo more strongly (e.g. Albanians projecting their 
1 Although in our results Serbs did show relatively high complexity, we have to take into account 
their low national identiﬁ cation. Most previous work on complexity induced participants to self-
select their most important identities. However, because we were speciﬁ cally interested in the 
complexity of national identity we included this category in the complexity measure regardless of 
whether people identiﬁ ed with it. Given Serbs’ low national identiﬁ cation it is possible that their 
relatively low overlap between ethnicity and nationality reﬂ ects national disidentiﬁ cation (which 
would also result in Serbs reporting that there is low overlap between Kosovar and Serb identity) 
rather than identity complexity. However, attesting the reliability of the complexity measure for 
Serb participants, results based on measures of their identity complexity without the national cat-
egory (i.e. based on their ethnicity and the two self-selected categories only, see, for example, 
Verkuyten & Martinovic,  2012 ) were highly similar to the results presented here. 
E. Maloku et al.
253
in-group on national identity, see Brewer et al. ( 2013 ) for a similar argument). 2 
 However , even when lower complexity makes it easier to identify with nationality 
this does not necessarily beneﬁ t the quality of the national identity or the relations 
between the two ethnic groups. Therefore, it is important to test the independent 
effects of the national identiﬁ cation and identity complexity on intergroup 
outcomes. 
 How Do Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs Differ 
on  Intergroup Outcomes? 
 We also found that Albanians and Serbs are equally warm towards members of their 
ethnic in-group and equally cold towards members of their ethnic out-group. 
Similarly, they show comparably high evaluations of their group’s morality, socia-
bility and competence. Out-group evaluations on these three dimensions gave us 
insight into the content of the stereotypes that Albanians and Serbs have of each 
other (i.e. warmth and competence; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu,  2002 ). Whereas 
Albanians’ stereotype of Serbs emphasises low warmth (low sociability and moral-
ity) but relatively high competence, Serbs’ stereotype about Albanians is one of both 
low competence and low warmth. According to the  stereotype content model (Fiske 
et al.,  2002 ; also see Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick,  2007 ) this suggests that whereas 
Albanians might feel envious towards Serbs, resulting in negative and even destruc-
tive behaviour, Serbs’ responses towards Albanians are more likely to reﬂ ect con-
tempt, leading them to reject or even harm Albanians. This pattern is intriguing and 
atypical in light of the status of Serbs relative to Albanians. When examining percep-
tions of group status, both Albanians and Serbs indeed perceive Albanians as having 
higher social status than Serbs. However, Serbs perceive this social hierarchy as less 
legitimate, less permeable and more stable than Albanians do. Finally, as expected, 
Serbs also experience more distinctiveness threat than Albanians: They report more 
concern for the acknowledgement of differences between Albanians and Serbs 
within Kosovar identity. Combined, Serbs perceptions of their low social status as 
illegitimate and stable with little opportunities for  individual advancement, their con-
temptuous stereotype of Albanians and their experienced distinctiveness threat make 
for a rather volatile intergroup climate in which Serbs may revolt and choose disrup-
tive forms of collective action if they perceive opportunities for improvements of 
their group’s status as hopeless (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam,  1990 ). 
 Our data also reveal that there is generally little contact between ethnic groups, 
although Serbs, being a minority, have more contact with Albanians than vice versa. 
More importantly, both ethnic groups are equally unwilling to have contact with one 
another (e.g. talking in the street, working together, being neighbours or friends). 
2  Importantly, the moderate size of this correlation in both groups allowed us to compare the indepen-
dent effects of superordinate categorisation and social identity complexity on intergroup outcomes 
within one analysis. 
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 Which Identity Process Predicts More  Positive Intergroup 
Attitudes? 
 Next, we examined which of the two presented models for improving intergroup 
relations—increasing superordinate categorisation with nationality or increasing 
identity complexity—best predicted positive intergroup outcomes in each group. To 
this aim we performed hierarchical regression analyses in which we predicted inter-
group outcomes from strength of superordinate identiﬁ cation and social identity 
complexity simultaneously, while also taking into account participants’ ethnic 
identiﬁ cation. 
 For Albanians, we found positive relations between intergroup attitudes and 
social identity complexity, but not with stronger superordinate  categorisation. 
Results show that Albanians with more complex identities experienced less distinc-
tiveness threat, had more positive evaluations of the competence of Serbs and were 
more willing to have contact with Serbs. However, although superordinate categori-
sation with the Kosovar nationality predicted more warmth towards Albanians and 
towards Kosovars in general, other relationships suggest negative effects for inter-
group relations. When we ran hierarchical regression to predict intergroup outcomes 
from superordinate identiﬁ cation and social identity complexity only, we found that 
identiﬁ cation with Kosovar nationality among Albanians predicted more positive 
evaluations of the in-group (i.e. more competence and morality for Albanians) but 
reduced warmth towards Serbs. Together, these ﬁ ndings suggest that whereas com-
plexity may beneﬁ t Albanians’ attitudes towards Serbs, identiﬁ cation with the 
“common” national identity does not. 
 For Serbs, we found a very different pattern. As predicted, their ethnic identiﬁ -
cation predicted more negative intergroup outcomes, i.e. more positive evaluations 
of their own group, less warmth towards the out-group (Kosovars and Albanians), 
and more distinctiveness threat. However, over and above these effects, there were 
positive relationships between identiﬁ cation with the superordinate Kosovar iden-
tity and intergroup outcomes. Identiﬁ cation with nationality was found to predict 
more warmth towards the Kosovars and Albanians, more positive stereotypes of 
Albanians in terms of morality, sociability and competence, and more positive in-
group evaluations (only on morality of Serbs). We found no relationships whatso-
ever with social identity complexity. This suggests that although national 
identiﬁ cation among Serbs is currently low, ﬁ nding ways to increase identiﬁ cation 
with the superordinate national category might be a way to improve their percep-
tions of Albanians. 
 Combined, these results suggest that in order to improve intergroup relations 
in Kosovo different strategies may be effective for different ethnic  groups . 
Whereas for Kosovar Albanians a more complex and inclusive identity deﬁ nition 
is related to more positive intergroup outcomes, for the Serb minority identiﬁ ca-
tion with the superordinate Kosovar nationality predicts more positive percep-
tions of Albanians. 
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 Conclusions and Future Directions 
 Our initial work (Maloku et al.,  2015 ) has shown that majority Albanians and minor-
ity Serbs in Kosovo continue to be highly segregated, with very little interaction, 
negative intergroup evaluations and little willingness to establish contact. This situ-
ation is problematic because segregation has been found to maintain and exacerbate 
intergroup tensions by mutual ignorance and suspicion (see Whyte,  1990 ; Gallagher, 
 1995 ; for segregation in Northern Ireland) , but also reinforce other forms of segrega-
tion (e.g. Boal,  1969 ) like separate schooling systems or different kinship  network-
ing . Such separation creates space for prejudice and stereotypes to ﬂ ourish even 
more (Whyte,  1990 ) thereby maintaining negative intergroup evaluations between 
Albanians and Serbs in our case. In our ﬁ rst study we examined which of two models 
of improving intergroup relations—the  common in-group identity model (Gaertner 
& Dovidio,  2000 ) or  social identity complexity theory (Roccas & Brewer,  2002 )—
would offer most opportunity for improving intergroup relations between Albanians 
and Serbs in Kosovo. Our ﬁ ndings suggest that both superordinate identity and 
social identity complexity are needed depending on the group under examination. 
We found that Albanians are low in identity complexity, so for them increased iden-
tity complexity predicts more positive intergroup outcomes. On the other hand, 
Serbs are low in superordinate identity, so for them strengthening the superordinate 
identity is related to more positive intergroup perceptions. Regarding the Albanian 
majority, we found that their  intergroup attitudes and perceptions were more positive 
to the degree that they deﬁ ned their multiple identities in a more complex way, with 
lower overlap between people belonging to their national, ethnic and other identities. 
Albanians with more complex identities were more positive about Serbs and were 
more willing to have contact with them, for example, by chatting with them in the 
street, working with them, and even becoming friends. Moreover, higher identity 
complexity was related to less concern for the distinctiveness of Albanians from 
Serbs in Kosovo. By contrast, among Albanians higher superordinate categorisation 
with Kosovo predicted only negative outcomes, possibly because, consistent with 
the  in-group projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel,  1999 ), for Albanians 
national identity was highly similar to ethnic identity. As a result, the more strongly 
Albanians identiﬁ ed with Kosovo, the less warmth they felt towards Serbs. 
 By contrast, we found that  social identity complexity was unrelated to intergroup 
relations for the Serb minority. Instead, their negative perceptions of the out-group 
(i.e. low warmth for Albanians and Kosovars) and concerns for maintaining the 
distinctiveness of their group within Kosovo were predicted by their high ethnic 
identiﬁ cation. Interestingly however, over and above the effects of ethnic identiﬁ ca-
tion, identiﬁ cation with the superordinate identity of Kosovo positively predicted 
warmth towards Albanians and Kosovars, and more positive stereotypes  of Albanians 
(i.e. warmer and more competent). This suggests that ﬁ nding ways to increase Serbs’ 
identiﬁ cation with Kosovo would be a second avenue towards improving intergroup 
relations in Kosovo. Moreover, the independence of Serbs’ identiﬁ cation with their 
ethnic and national groups suggests that identiﬁ cation with the superordinate 
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national category does not have to come at the expense of identiﬁ cation with the 
ethnic group. 
 Based on these ﬁ rst correlational insights, future work should examine how to 
increase identity complexity among Kosovar Albanians and test whether increasing 
the complexity of Albanians’ identity indeed improves their perceptions of Serbs 
and their willingness to interact with them. Work on the antecedents of  social iden-
tity complexity has suggested that identities tend to be more complex when people 
become more aware of the non- overlapping parts of their identities, for example, 
when they interact with ethnic out-groups or live in more diverse neighbourhoods, 
and when they experience lower distinctiveness threat (Brewer & Pierce,  2005 ; 
Schmid et al.,  2009 ; Schmid, Hewstone, & Al Ramiah,  2013 ). Indeed, in the current 
study we also found that Kosovar Albanians displayed higher identity complexity to 
the degree that they reported less concern for the distinctiveness of their ethnic iden-
tity within the Kosovar identity. In future work we plan to examine whether induc-
ing Kosovar Albanians to focus on parts of their national identity that do not overlap 
with their  ethnic identity , while simultaneously satisfying distinctiveness needs (for 
example, by enabling Albanians to afﬁ rm the distinctiveness of their group) will 
increase their identity complexity and subsequently result in more positive attitudes 
towards Kosovar Serbs. 
 Similarly, future research should establish the beneﬁ cial effects of national iden-
tiﬁ cation for the intergroup attitudes of Kosovar Serbs. Previous research has estab-
lished that identiﬁ cation with a superordinate  category only improves minority 
group members’ out-group attitudes when they perceive their group as prototypical 
for the overarching group (Ufkes, Otten, Van der Zee, Giebels, & Dovidio,  2012 ). 
Moreover, for Serbs the common in-group may pose threats to the distinctiveness of 
their ethnic group. More recent developments in the common in-group identity 
model have related the importance of emphasising dual identities—an emphasis on 
the superordinate identity as well as the subgroup identities—especially for minor-
ity group members (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy,  2009 ). By focusing on dual identi-
ties attention is paid to the distinctive features of both groups, but the connection 
with the former out-group is improved through the common superordinate category. 
In future research we aim to test whether a  dual identity approach will also improve 
national identiﬁ cation among Kosovar Serbs, and whether this will subsequently 
improve their perceptions of Albanians and willingness to interact with them. 
 Although our investigation sheds light on the intergroup dynamics between 
Kosovar Albanians and Serbs, and offers some suggestions for how to improve their 
relations, our investigation also uncovered two unsettling aspects of current inter-
group dynamics in  Kosovo that may limit any attempt to improve the  peace-building 
process in the country. Firstly, in terms of intergroup stereotypes, our ﬁ ndings show 
that both groups have quite a negative stereotype of each other that seriously limit 
opportunities for positive intergroup contact. Albanians’ stereotype of Serbs can be 
characterised as envious, depicting Serbs as low in warmth but competitive because 
of their high competence. This stereotype has been associated with harmful and 
ambivalent behaviour, involving both resentment and respect (Cuddy et al.,  2007 ). 
Moreover, out-groups that are perceived as high in ability but low in warmth tend to 
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be scapegoated when societies experience instability (Glick,  2005 ). Given the insta-
bility of Kosovo in terms of economic outcomes and intergroup relations, the way 
Kosovar Albanians perceive Serbs does not bode well for future intergroup 
relations. 
 At the same time Serbs’ stereotype of Albanians is one of low warmth and low 
competence. Based on the  stereotype content model (Fiske et al.,  2002 ), this stereo-
type predicts contempt and disgust of Serbs towards Albanians, which may moti-
vate Serbs to distance themselves from Albanians by excluding and demeaning 
them (Cuddy et al.,  2007 ). In combination, the content of the stereotypes Albanians 
and Serbs have of each other may prove to seriously limit opportunities for improved 
intergroup relations. On a positive note, among Serbs superordinate identiﬁ cation 
with Kosovo was also related to a more positive out-group stereotype on both 
warmth and competence dimensions. However, among Albanians higher identity 
complexity was related only to more positive perceptions of the competence of 
Serbs, but not to their perceived warmth. Consequently, attempts to enhance identity 
complexity among Albanians may actually result in even more envious stereotypes 
of  Serbs as more competent but still cold. As such, the increased willingness to have 
contact with Serbs among Albanians with more complex identities found here may 
reﬂ ect an increased passive facilitation of Serbs that ﬁ ts interaction with an envied 
out-group (Cuddy et al.,  2007 ), rather than  cooperative intergroup interactions that 
are associated with out-groups that are perceived as high in both competence and 
warmth. 
 Secondly, our ﬁ ndings reﬂ ect another disturbing quality of intergroup dynamics 
in Kosovo, namely the illegitimacy, impermeability and stability of the social hier-
archy that ethnic minority Serbs perceive. Our measures of perceptions of the status 
hierarchy revealed that Serbs not only perceive their ethnic group as having much 
lower societal status than the Albanian majority, they rate this situation as extremely 
unfair, and unlikely to change in the future. From a social identity perspective 
(Wright et al.,  1990 ), this situation reads as a recipe for underground resistance, 
subculture gang formation, and non-normative collective action, especially with so 
many young people, the high unemployment rates in Kosovo and the perception that 
this is unlikely to change. In order to improve intergroup relations in Kosovo the 
ﬁ rst step therefore seems to be to distribute opportunities and outcomes more fairly 
between Albanian and Serb Kosovars. The fact that the Albanian students in our 
sample acknowledged to a certain degree the illegitimacy of the higher status of 
their ethnic group might be a ﬁ rst step towards improving the opportunities of Serbs 
in Kosovo and moving towards more positive intergroup relations in Kosovo. 
However, given the current hostile climate, improving  positive intergroup relations 
may prove to be a long process. 
 To conclude, the research project reported in this chapter provides ﬁ rst insight 
into the intergroup dynamics that operate when two ethnic groups who have been 
involved in one of the deadliest European wars since World War II, seek peace, 
reconciliation and integration. The ﬁ rst results suggest that, even when intergroup 
relations are tense and actual integration between former conﬂ icting groups is far 
away, current models of intergroup relations such as the  common in-group identity 
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model and the social identity complexity perspective help to describe and explain 
current intergroup processes. Moreover, even in these tense and highly segregated 
 circumstances these two models can aid in developing a more stable and less con-
ﬂ ictuous future for post-conﬂ ict societies. 
 References 
 Assembly of Kosovo. (2001).  Law on the use of languages 02/L-37. Retrieved from  http://www.
assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2006_02-L37_en.pdf . 
 Boal, F. W. (1969). Territoriality on the Shankhill-Falls divide, Belfast.  Irish Geography, 6 , 30–50. 
doi: 10.1177/0309132513509546 . 
 Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., Ellemers, N., & Doosje, B. (1999). The context and content of 
identity threat. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears, & B. Doosje (Eds.),  Social identity: Context, commit-
ment, content (pp. 35–58). Oxford, England: Blackwell. 
 Brewer, M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational 
analysis.  Psychological Bulletin, 86 (2), 307–324. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1037/0033-2909.86.2.307 . 
 Brewer, M. B. (2010). Social identity complexity and acceptance of diversity. In R. J. Crisp (Ed.), 
 The psychology of social and cultural diversity (pp. 12–33). West Sussex, England: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
 Brewer, M. B., Gonsalkorale, K., & Van Dommelen, A. (2013). Social identity complexity: 
Comparing majority and minority ethnic group members in a multicultural society.  Group 
Processes & Intergroup Relations, 16 (5), 529–544. doi: 10.1177/1368430212468622 . 
 Brewer, M. B., & Pierce, K. P. (2005). Social identity complexity and outgroup tolerance. 
 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31 , 428–437. doi: 10.1177/0146167204271710 . 
 Bytyçi, F. & Than, K. (2015, February 4). Dramatic surge in Kosovars crossing illegally into EU. 
 Reuters. Retrieved from  http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/04/us-kosovo-eu-migrants-
idUSKBN0L811120150204 
 Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2007). The BIAS map: Behaviors from intergroup affect 
and stereotypes.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92 , 631–648. doi: 10.1037/
0022-3514.92.4.631 . 
 Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., & Saguy, T. (2009). Commonalty and the complexity of ‘we’: Social 
attitudes and social change.  Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13 , 3–20. 
doi: 10.1177/1088868308326751 . 
 Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2002). Self and social identity.  Annual Review of 
Psychology, 53 (1), 161–186. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135228 . 
 Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: 
competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition.  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 82 (6), 878–902. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.878 . 
 Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2000).  Reducing intergroup bias: The Common ingroup identity 
model . Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. 
 Gallagher, A. M. (1995). The approach of government: Community relations and equity. In S. Dunn 
(Ed.),  Facets of the confl ict in Northern Ireland (pp. 27–43). New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 Glick, P. (2005). Sacriﬁ cial lambs dressed in wolves’ clothing: Envious prejudice, ideology, and 
the scapegoating of Jews. In L. S. Newman & R. Erber (Eds.),  Understanding genocide: The 
social psychology of the Holocaust (pp. 113–142). London: Oxford University Press. 
 International Committee of the Red Cross. (2014, November). Western Balkans: After 15 years, 
more than 1,600 people still missing in Kosovo. Retrieved from  https://www.icrc.org/en/docu-
ment/western-balkans-after-15-years-more-1600-people-still-missing-kosovo#.
VGxTJfmG_V8 . 
E. Maloku et al.
259
 Jetten, J., Spear, R., & Manstead, A. (2001). Similarity as a source of differentiation: The role of 
group identiﬁ cation.  European Journal of Social Psychology, 31 , 621–640. doi: 10.1002/
ejsp.72 . 
 Judah, T. (2008).  Kosovo: What everyone needs to know . Oxford, England: Oxford University 
Press. 
 Kosovo Government (2015). Retrieved from  https://www.rks-gov.net/en-US/Republika/Kosova/
Pages/default.aspx . 
 Kosovo Agency of Statistics (2012).  REKOS 2011 Population Census Data. Author . Retrieved 
from  http://askdata.rks-gov.net/PXWeb/pxweb/en/askdata/?rxid = 0b4e087e-8b00-47ba-b7cf-
1ea158040712/ . 
 Malcolm, N. (1998).  Kosovo: A short history . London: Pan Macmillan. 
 Maloku, E., Derks, B., Van Laar, C., & Ellemers, N. (2015). Building a Kosovar identity: Effects 
of social identity complexity and superordinate categorization on intergroup relations between 
Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Manuscript in preparation. 
 McKeown, S. (2014). Perceptions of a superordinate identity in Northern Ireland.  Peace and 
Confl ict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 20 (4), 505. doi: 10.1037/pac0000051 . 
 Miller, K. P., Brewer, M. B., & Arbuckle, N. L. (2009). Social identity complexity: Its correlates and 
antecedents.  Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 12 (1), 79–94. doi: 10.1177/1368430208098778 . 
 Mummendey, A., & Wenzel, M. (1999). Social discrimination and tolerance in intergroup rela-
tions: Reactions to intergroup difference.  Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3 (2), 
158–174. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr0302_4 . 
 O’Neill, W. G. (2002).  Kosovo: An unfi nished peace . Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 Riek, B. M., Mania, E. W., & Gaertner, S. L. (2006). Intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes: A 
meta-analytic review.  Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10 , 336–353. doi: 10.1207/
s15327957pspr1004_4 . 
 Roccas, S., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). Social identity complexity.  Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 6 , 88–106. doi: 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0602 . 
 Schmid, K., Hewstone, M., Tausch, N., Cairns, E., & Hughes, J. (2009). Antecedents and con-
sequences of social identity complexity: Intergroup contact, distinctiveness threat, and 
 outgroup attitudes.  Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35 , 1085–1098. doi: 10.1177/
0146167209337037 . 
 Schmid, K., Hewstone, M., & Al Ramiah, A. (2013). Neighborhood diversity and social identity 
complexity: Implications for intergroup relations.  Social Psychological and Personality 
Science, 4 , 135–142. doi: 10.1177/1948550612446972 . 
 Sidanius, J., Feshbach, S., Levin, S., & Pratto, F. (1997). The interface between ethnic and national 
attachment: Ethnic pluralism or ethnic dominance?  Public Opinion Quarterly, 61 , 102–133. 
Retrieved from  http://www.jstor.org/stable/274951 . 
 Sinclair, S., Sidanius, J., & Levin, S. (1998). The interface between ethnic and social system 
attachment: The differential effects of hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating environ-
ments.  Journal of Social Issues, 54 , 741–757. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.1998 . 
 Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conﬂ ict. In W. G. Austin & 
S. Worchel (Eds.),  The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: 
Brooks/Cole. 
 Ufkes, E. G., Otten, S., Van der Zee, K. I., Giebels, E., & Dovidio, J. F. (2012). Urban district 
identity as a common ingroup identity: The different role of ingroup prototypicality for minor-
ity and majority groups.  European Journal of Social Psychology, 42 (6), 706–716. doi: 10.1002/
ejsp.1888 . 
 United Nations Development Program (2010). Kosovo Human Development Report. Author. 
Prishtina: Kosovo. Retrieved from  http://www.ks.undp.org/content/dam/kosovo/docs/KHDR/
HDR_2010_English.pdf . 
 Verkuyten, M., & Martinovic, B. (2012). Immigrants’ national identiﬁ cation: Meanings, determi-
nants, and consequences.  Social Issues and Policy Review, 6 (1), 82–112. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-
2409.2011.01036.x . 
16 Building National Identity in Newborn Kosovo: Challenges of Integrating…
260
 Whyte, J. (1990).  Interpreting Northern Ireland . Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
 World Bank. (2010).  Kosovo—unlocking growth potential: Strategies, policies, actions: A country 
economic memorandum . Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from  http://documents.world-
bank.org/curated/en/2010/04/12330091/kosovo-unlocking-growth-potential-strategies-policies-
actions-country-economic- memorandum . 
 Wright, S. C., Taylor, D. M., & Moghaddam, F. M. (1990). Responding to membership in a disad-
vantages group: From acceptance to collective protest.  Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 58 (6), 994–1003. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.994 . 
E. Maloku et al.
